

CHAPTER  
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PRIMARY SOURCE *from The Republic*  
by Plato

Section 1

*Plato, a Greek philosopher and writer, lived in Athens during its golden age. Much of his work takes the form of a dialogue between two or more people. In this excerpt from Plato's most famous work, The Republic, the Greek philosopher Socrates and Plato's older brother Glaucon hold a conversation about the ideal statesman. According to Plato, why should philosophers run the government?*

*The Philosopher's Fitness to Rule*

So at last, Glaucon, after this long and weary way, we have come to see who are the philosophers and who are not.

I doubt if the way could have been shortened. Apparently not. I think, however, that we might have gained a still clearer view, if this had been the only topic to be discussed; but there are so many others awaiting us, if we mean to discover in what ways the just life is better than the unjust.

Which are we to take up now?

Surely the one that follows next in order. Since the philosophers are those who can apprehend the eternal and unchanging, while those who cannot do so, but are lost in the mazes of multiplicity and change, are not philosophers, which of the two ought to be in control of a state?

I wonder what would be a reasonable solution. To establish as Guardians whichever of the two appear competent to guard the laws and ways of life in society.

True.

Well, there can be no question whether a guardian who is to keep watch over anything needs to be keen-sighted or blind. And is not blindness precisely the condition of men who are entirely cut off from knowledge of any reality, and have in their soul no clear pattern of perfect truth, which they might study in every detail and constantly refer to, as a painter looks at his model, before they proceed to embody notions of justice, honour, and goodness in earthly institutions or, in their character of Guardians, to preserve such institutions as already exist?

Certainly such a condition is very like blindness. Shall we, then, make such as these our Guardians in preference to men who, besides their knowledge of realities, are in no way inferior to them in experience and in every excellence of character? It would be absurd not to choose the philosophers,

whose knowledge is perhaps their greatest point of superiority, provided they do not lack those other qualifications.

What we have to explain, then, is how those qualifications can be combined in the same persons with philosophy.

Certainly.

The first thing, as we said at the outset, is to get a clear view of their inborn disposition. When we are satisfied on that head, I think we shall agree that such a combination of qualities is possible and that we need look no further for men fit to be in control of a commonwealth. One trait of the philosophic nature we may take as already granted: a constant passion for any knowledge that will reveal to them something of that reality which endures for ever and is not always passing into and out of existence. And, we may add, their desire is to know the whole of that reality; they will not willingly renounce any part of it as relatively small and insignificant, as we said before when we compared them to the lover and to the man who covets honour.

True.

Is there not another trait which the nature we are seeking cannot fail to possess—truthfulness, a love of truth and a hatred of falsehood that will not tolerate untruth in any form?

Yes, it is natural to expect that.

It is not merely natural, but entirely necessary that an instinctive passion for any object should extend to all that is closely akin to it; and there is nothing more closely akin to wisdom than truth. So the same nature cannot love wisdom and falsehood; the genuine lover of knowledge cannot fail, from his youth up, to strive after the whole of truth.

I perfectly agree.

Now we surely know that when a man's desires set strongly in one direction, in every other channel they flow more feebly, like a stream diverted into another bed. So when the current has set towards knowledge and all that goes with it, desire will

abandon those pleasures of which the body is the instrument and be concerned only with the pleasure which the soul enjoys independently—if, that is to say, the love of wisdom is more than a mere pretence. Accordingly, such a one will be temperate and no lover of money; for he will be the last person to care about the things for the sake of which money is eagerly sought and lavishly spent.

That is true.

Again, in seeking to distinguish the philosophic nature, you must not overlook the least touch of meanness. Nothing could be more contrary than pettiness to a mind constantly bent on grasping the whole of things, both divine and human.

Quite true.

And do you suppose that one who is so high-minded and whose thought can contemplate all time and all existence will count this life of man a matter of much concern?

No, he could not.

So for such a man death will have no terrors.

None.

A mean and cowardly nature, then, can have no part in the genuine pursuit of wisdom.

I think not.

And if a man is temperate and free from the love of money, meanness, pretentiousness, and cowardice, he will not be hard to deal with or dishonest. So, as another indication of the philosophic temper, you will observe whether, from youth up, he is fair-minded, gentle, and sociable.

Certainly.

Also you will not fail to notice whether he is quick or slow to learn. No one can be expected to take a reasonable delight in a task in which much painful effort makes little headway. And if he cannot retain what he learns, his forgetfulness will leave no room in his head for knowledge; and so, having all his toil for nothing, he can only end by hating himself as well as his fruitless occupation. We must not, then, count a forgetful mind as competent to pursue wisdom; we must require a good memory.

By all means.

Further, there is in some natures a crudity and awkwardness that can only tend to a lack of measure and proportion; and there is a close affinity [attraction or kinship] between proportion and truth. Hence, besides our other requirements, we shall look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, which will be instinctively drawn to see every reality in its true light.

Yes.

Well then, now that we have enumerated the qualities of a mind destined to take its full part in the apprehension of reality, have you any doubt about their being indispensable and all necessarily going together?

None whatever.

Then have you any fault to find with a pursuit which none can worthily follow who is not by nature quick to learn and to remember, magnanimous [unselfish] and gracious, the friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage, temperance?

No. . . .

Well then, when time and education have brought such characters as these to maturity, would you entrust the care of your commonwealth to anyone else?

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CHAPTER  
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## Section 3

PRIMARY SOURCE *from Politics*  
by Aristotle

*The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) spent 20 years at Plato's Academy. He eventually started his own school and tutored Alexander until his royal student became the king of Macedonia. Aristotle wrote influential books on many different topics, including biology, rhetoric, poetry, and politics. As you read this passage from Book IV of Aristotle's Politics, think about how he uses logic to arrive at definitions of two principal forms of government that existed in ancient Greece.*

One should not regard democracy, in the way some are now accustomed to do, as being simply where the multitude is in control (for, in fact, both in oligarchies and everywhere else, the greater part is in control), nor should one regard oligarchy as being where few have control over the regime. For if the whole number were 1,300, and 1,000 of these were rich but gave no share in rule to the 300 who, though free and similar in other respects, were poor, no one would say that they were running a democracy. Likewise too, if the poor were few but stronger than the well-off, who were more numerous, no one would call such a regime an oligarchy if the others, though wealthy, had no share in the honors. It should, then, rather be said that popular rule is when the free are in control and oligarchy is when the rich are; but it happens that the first are many and the second few, since many are free and few are rich. For otherwise there would be an oligarchy if offices were distributed according to size, as some say is the case in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, because the beautiful and the tall are few in number.

Yet it is not even enough to distinguish these regimes by these criteria alone. Rather, since there are several parts to the populace and to oligarchy, it is necessary to grasp further that neither would there be popular rule if the free who were few were ruling over those who were a majority and not

free (as, for example, in Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and in Thera, for in each of these cities the honors belonged to those who, though few among many, were superior in good birth and had got first possession of the colonies), nor would there be popular rule if the rich were superior in numbers (as, for example, in Colophon long ago, for there the majority had acquired much substance before the war against the Lydians). But it is democracy when the free and needy who are the majority have control of rule, and it is oligarchy when the rich and better born who are few have control.

*from The Politics of Aristotle, Peter L. Phillips Simpson, trans. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of*